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Abstract: We derive the time-dependent photo-detection probability 
equation of a superconducting single photon detector (SSPD) to study the 
responsive property for a pulse train at high repetition rate. Using this 
equation, we analyze the characteristics of SSPDs when illuminated by 
bright pulses in blinding attack on a quantum key distribution (QKD). We 
obtain good agreement between expected values based on our equation and 
actual experimental values. Such a time-dependent probability analysis 
contributes to security analysis. 
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1. Introduction  
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two users, Alice and Bob, to share random 
numbers with the unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics. 
BB84[2] is the most famous protocol of QKD. Recently QKD systems have been deployed in 
the field environment, and tested for their reliability.[3-5] One should, however, note that 
unconditional security proofs assume that devices operate as required and their imperfections 
are within certain ranges as specified by the mathematical model.  A gap between theory and 
practical implementation, i. e. side channels, can be reduced, but never vanishes. Protocols 
with simpler implementation are generally less vulnerable to side channels. Differential-
phase-shift (DPS)-QKD protocol [6, 7] has a simpler structure, especially in the receiver, 
which consists of an asymmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer and two single photon 
detectors as in Fig. 1(a), and hence enables stable operation and long distance transmission. It 
has been applied for 90 km transmission with SSPDs [8-11] in the Tokyo QKD network. [3] 
The SSPDs used there have very low dark count rates, and therefore they are suitable for a 
long distance QKD. Unfortunately, however, these detectors are threatened by detector side 
channel attacks.  
Actually, eavesdropping by controlling single photon detectors (SPDs) have been proposed 
and demonstrated as mentioned later. In general, SPDs cannot count a photon number in the 
pulse, and they discriminate differential signals only, because SPDs are connected to 
amplifiers with capacitive coupling, and it follows that a user cannot know direct current level 
of SPDs. These facts imply that SPDs cannot distinguish between no-photon state and a state 
with no change which can be caused by continuously illuminating with bright input power 
beyond the normal operating range. Thus, it is possible to blind SPDs by bright continuous 
wave (CW) illumination. Moreover, semiconductor SPDs have “linear region” in which the 
output voltage from an SPD linearly increases with the power of very bright photo-
illumination.[12, 13] Such a characteristics enables intercept and resend attack[14], without 
being detected by Alice and Bob. Recently, hacking of commercial QKD systems by CW 
illumination superposed with strong pulses have been reported.[13] On the other hand, SSPDs 
do not have “linear region” of output voltage to input photo-power. To disguise the single 
photon counting event of SSPDs, attackers must revive superconductivity in SSPDs after the 
bright illumination blinding. That means sequential pulse illumination with well-calibrated 
modulation (bright and dark) should be illuminated to SSPDs. Indeed, hacking SSPDs in 
DPS-QKD system by bright illumination with tailored power-reduced pulses was 
proposed[15] and demonstrated.[16]. In that case, the recovery time of SSPDs should be 
analyzed carefully. In general, the recovery times of SPDs in QKD systems are longer than 
pulse recurrence period of a QKD system. This is because it is difficult to develop a high rate 
SPD, and also the photo-detection rate is much smaller than photon transmission frequency 
due to the high attenuation in a transmission line and small photon number per pulse in QKD 
protocol. If the repetition period of the photo–detection is closer to the recovery time of a SPD, 
the detection efficiency changes according to history of photo-detection events. In addition, 
eavesdropping using pulse train named “sequential attack”[17] was proposed against the DPS-
QKD system, where the detection events are bunched as a result of the eavesdropping. To 
catch this attack, the users must monitor the correlations of the detection events. Hence it is 
necessary to characterize the behavior of an SSPD against a pulse train to study loophole of 
the QKD system with SSPDs. 
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Fig. 1. (a) Conceptual view of DPS-QKD system. (b) Conceptual view and (c) equivalent circuit of the 
superconductor single photon detector (SSPD). 
 
 
In the experiment in Ref. [15], CW illumination with power of a few mW was used to blind 
SSPDs. Note that blinding attack with such strong power illumination can be detected easily, 
for instance  by tapping 1% of optical pulses from a quantum channel and measuring the 
power of them. In this power measurement, Bob can detect the blinding attack using a 
commercial optical-power meter, if CW illumination with the power of mW region was used 
in the hacking. On the other hand, Honjo et al.[16] demonstrated controlling SSPDs in the 1 
GHz clocked DPS-QKD system and countermeasure against hacking by using pulse shaped 
bright illumination. They succeeded in decreasing the input optical-power to a few µW. 
However, it means that more than 10000 photons/pulse was needed to blind SSPDs. To know 
the behaviors of SSPDs in bright illumination is necessary to consider more effective way of 
bright illumination attack. In this paper, we discuss the equation of the photo-detection 
probability of our SSPDs to pulse train, and compare counting rate from the equation with 
experimental results. Such a consideration is useful for the effective hacking as well as 
countermeasure against bright illumination blinding attack on SSPDs. 
2. Superconducting single photon detectors in our DPS-QKD system 
Figure 1(b) and (c) show the conceptual view and equivalent circuit of our SSPD system. We 
have developed a multi-channel NbN SSPD system[10, 11] based on the Gifford McMahon 
(GM) cryocooler that can offer guaranteed performance, be cryogen free, and be capable of 
turnkey, continuous operation with low input power consumption. There is a photograph of 
the SSPD system in the inset of on the left of Fig. 1(b). A superconductor nanowire has large 
inductance named kinetic inductance (Lk) in itself. We adopt a 50  shunt resistance to 
suppress oscillation in the circuit shown in Fig. 1(b). The SSPD is biased with a current Ib 
slightly below the critical value Ic. An incident photon generates a resistive “hotspot” which 
disrupts the superconductivity across the wire, resulting in propagating a voltage pulse to the 
AC coupled amplifier. The output voltage pulse of ~GainIb RL is input to the discriminator, 
where Gain is the gain of the amplifier. When a pulse height exceeds the threshold voltage of 
discriminator, the system registers the detection of photons 
Potential time constants which would limit recovery time of a SSPD are (1) thermal 
diffusion[18], (2) time constant in the electrical circuit[19], and (3) latching[20]. In these time 
constants, (2) limits our SSPD system dominantly. In our system, the thermal conductance in 
the SSPD is high enough compared to input optical power. In addition, our SSPDs with active 
area of 15 µm15 µm have Lk with 1-2 µH and such a large Lk decreases the probability of 
latching[20]. Thanks to such a large size, high coupling efficiency between a single mode 
fiber and an SSPD can be obtained. After the hotspot is formed, the superconducting current 
through it recovers with the time constant of Lk/RL, where RL is the load resistance (in our 
case: 25 ). Since our SSPDs are susceptible to electrical reflection due to the impedance 
mismatch, we use a shunt resistance with 50 shown in Fig. 1(b) to avoid electrical 
oscillation or reflection. In the counter measure against a CW illumination attack, monitoring 
photocurrent is very useful and demonstrated in Ref. [21]. However, such a technique is not 
suitable for our system due to susceptibility to electrical oscillation. The current Ib which 
flows in the superconductor nanowire depends on the time as follows. 
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where I0 is the initial bias current. The detection efficiency ( ) depends on the bias current. 
Ref [19] also investigated the time-dependence of the detection efficiency after the detection 
event by using optical pulse pair. Our goal in the future is to establish full quantum optical 
model of SSPDs, i.e., to obtain a full description of SSPD for positive operator valued 
measure (POVM) that can express a time dependent behavior for multiple photons.  In the 
present work, we focus, as the first step, on studying the time dependent photo-detection 
probability for a pulse train. The standard model for the SSPD’s POVM is given as, 
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where off is the  operator for no-detection event, |n> is for an n-photon state, and the detection 
operator is given on =1-off. In this equation, we must introduce the function = 0*f(Ib), 
where 0 is the initial quantum efficiency. And f(Ib) which describes a relative quantum 
efficiency dependent on bias current  can be obtained from experimental results illustrated by 
example in Fig. 2. When we calculate f(Ib), some fitting curves are assigned according to Ib. 
Decrease of the practical bias current according to eq. (1) induces the depression of the 
detection efficiency. Moreover, we have to consider the specific condition of the readout 
circuit of the SSPD. 
 
Fig. 2 Quantum efficiency and dark count rate of the superconductor single photon detector (CH5) as 
functions of bias current. Bias current (Ib) is normalized by critical current (Ic). 
3. The detection probability of SSPDs for a pulse train 
In this section, the detection probability for the train with an interval of T is considered. The 
input signal is set in coherent state |α. The detection probability equation of an SPD for single 
event is described as “1-exp(-|α|2)” in Ref. [22]. To obtain the detection probability for the 
pulse train considering the recovery time of an SSPD, we decompose the detection process: At 
first, the normal conductance transition probability Son of SSPD to pulse train is obtained as 
follows in a recursive way.  
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where γ is the dark count probability of the SSPD,  Soff (NT) and Son(NT) are the 
superconducting state probability and normal conductance state probability at a time slot of 
“NT”, respectively.   
To recognize the photo-detection event in the SSPD system, RLIb(NT)Gain must exceed 
threshold (Vth) of the discriminator. In our case the load resistance RL is 25. Therefore, we 
have 
( ) ( ) ( )
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where Pon(NT) is the photo-detection event probability at the time slot of “NT”. In our case, 
Vth is set around 8-40 m V.  For example, Vth of CH5 is set 40 mV, and if I0 (initial bias 
current: 22.2 µA) is added to the detector, 55.5 mV pulse is generated at photon detection. 
The minimum Ib that can exceed Vth is about 72% of initial bias current (I0). At that bias 
current, the detection efficiency is 0.122% shown in Fig. 2. Note that we approximate g(NT) 
by Soff ((N-1)T) since this probability mostly affects the recovery of Ib. 
4. Blinding SSPDs with pulse shaped illumination considering response time 
Using these equations, behavior of the SSPD at blinding attack can be estimated. , Lk and Ic 
of our SSPDs are listed in TABLE I. Figure 3 shows the counting rates as functions of input 
power of optical-pulse train of 300 ps width and 1 GHz repetition rate. Solid lines are 
experimental data and dashed lines are simulated values from eq. (4). In the simulated curves, 
a cutoff rate of the discriminator in our setting was taken into account. In the figure, one can 
see the plateau in the counting rate about 66-70 M count/s, which is the maximum counting 
rate of the discriminator in our setup. And the simulated figures are in agreement with the 
experimental values, especially in the high power incident region. Note that it is important for 
the eavesdropper to know the input power needed to blind SSPDs with count rate below a few 
hundred, since this is approximately the same as dark count rate of SSPDs connected to the 
field installed fibers so that Alice and Bob would regard these counts as the dark counts. 
Figure 3 indicates that the SSPD with a relatively small Lk (CH5) requires input pulses of -
30dBm to blind the SSPD with counting rate of a few hundred c/s. That means 8000 
photons/pulse are necessary for blinding. And variation in Lk makes more than 3dB difference 
in the optical-power for the blinding.  
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Fig. 3. Counting rate of SSPDs to pulse train of 1 GHz as functions of input power. Solid lines are 
experimental data and dashed lines are theoretical values from eq.(4). Linear (a), and log (b) scale. 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of SSPDs. 
No.SSPD  at dark count rate 
of 100c/s (%) 
Critical current Ic 
(µA) 
Kinetic inductance Lk 
(µH) 
CH2 11.7 12.2 2.13 
CH4 12.1 24 1.14 
CH5 18.0 24.5 1.12 
CH6 10.0 13.1 1.73 
 
While Lydresen et al.[15] used 0-/2 modulated CW laser, Honjo et al.[16] employed 0- 
modulated blinding pulse of 300 ps width at  1 GHz clock as shown in Fig. 4(a) and (b). The 
optical-input pulse for blinding decreased from mW to several µW. However, the required 
optical power for blinding can be reduced further, because the recovery time is much longer 
than the pulse interval of 1GHz repetition. As a result, many photons are required to blind 
SSPDs. To incapacitate SSPDs with weaker optical-power, we can deem the power of the 
optical pulse according to the calculation based on Eq. (4), as shown in Fig. 4(c). For example 
in CH5, the maximum  on which the Ib is just below Vth is 0.122% mentioned in section 3. 
And the recovery time is calculated 58 ns by using eq. (1) and a kinetic inductance of CH5. 
Input pulse of 10000 photons per interval of 58 ns keeps CH5 at normal conductance state 
with more than 99.999% probability. In the case of CH2, the recovery time is is estimated as 
13 ns and the required photons for blinding are 25000. To apply this consideration to the 1 
GHz clock DPS-QKD system, which uses 1-nsec-double pulse, four times input power is 
necessary for blinding both of the detectors, assuming that two SSPDs have the same recovery 
time. Even in this case, the total optical-power for blinding is estimated only less than 90-990 
nW, which is 5-10dB less than that of previous works. If a pair of SSPDs with different 
recovery times is used in a QKD system, 1-nsec-double pulse should be used to blind a target 
detector shown in Fig. 4(d). At the same time, bright light pulses are input to the other 
detector, and such a bright light pulse makes the other detector click with high probability. For 
example, suppose that CH2 and CH5 SSPDs are used in a DPS-QKD. When CH5 is blinded, 
CH2 clicks with probability of 89.4% for the first pulse and totally 98.9% at the first double 
pulse illumination. As a counter-measure to detect the blinding, Bob intends to have the 
simultaneous clicks of the detectors by switching the output port of the asymmetric Mach-
Zehnder interferometer by changing its phase. In that case, the probability of NO-click in CH5 
at the first double pulse and detection at the next pulse is estimated 0.22%, as a result, the 
probability of simultaneous detection in two ports increases to about 0.2% per blinding event. 
This value must be divided by the interval of 58 to compare with the normal 1GHz operating 
condition. As a result, the coincidence rate is estimated as 3.5e-3%, which is more than 29000 
times larger than at normal operation. Therefore, Bob can detect the blinding pulse which is 
optimized for each SSPD by shifting the phase 0- occasionally. 
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Fig. 4. Conceptual views of bright illumination blinding attack by (a) continuous wave laser, (b) pulse train, 
(c) pulse train with considering of response time, and (d) controlling detection port with 1-nsec-doble pulse. 
5. Conclusion 
In summary, we present an approach to obtain the equation which gives detection probability 
of SSPDs for a pulse train. A better understanding of the behavior under a pulse train, which 
our equation provides with us, is useful to consider an effective attack as well as 
countermeasure against bright illumination blinding attack to the QKD system. Such an 
analysis is necessary to dissect the security of the QKD system. 
